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Abstract
We consider an odd-sized “jury”, which votes sequentially between two states of Nature
(say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty) with the majority opinion determining the verdict.
Jurors have private information in the form of a signal in [−1,+1], with higher signals
indicating A more likely. Each juror has an ability in [0, 1], which is proportional to the
probability of A given a positive signal, an analog of Condorcet’s p for binary signals. We
assume that jurors vote honestly for the alternative they view more likely, given their signal
and prior voting, because they are experts who want to enhance their reputation (after
their vote and actual state of Nature is revealed). For a fixed set of jury abilities, the
reliability of the verdict depends on the voting order. For a jury of size three, the optimal
ordering is always as follows: middle ability first, then highest ability, then lowest. For
sufficiently heterogeneous juries, sequential voting is more reliable than simultaneous voting
and is in fact optimal (allowing for non-honest voting). When average ability is fixed, verdict
reliability is increasing in heterogeneity.
For medium-sized juries, we find through simulation that the median ability juror should
still vote first and the remaining ones should have increasing and then decreasing abilities.
Keywords: voting, Condorcet, verdict reliability
1 Introduction
This paper extends the Condorcet Jury Theory to juries that vote sequentially (knowing earlier
votes) rather than simultaneously. Since we consider jurors who are heterogenous with respect
to their ability to determine the true state of Nature (equiprobable A or B, Innocent or Guilty)
it turns out that the order in which they vote affects the reliability of the majority verdict. By
reliability we simply mean the probability that the majority verdict agrees with the actual state
of Nature. We prove that for a jury of size three with any fixed abilities, the voting order with
greatest reliability is median ability first, then highest ability, then lowest. Using simulation,
we suggest that, for medium-sized juries, the median ability juror should still vote first. Then
the abilities should increase, and after the highest ability juror votes, the rest should vote in
decreasing order.
In a model where jurors have private information in the form of a binary signal (A or B),
Condorcet showed that for jurors of fixed ability p > 1/2 (probability of a correct signal), or of
varying abilities all at least p, the reliability approaches 1 as the jury size increases.
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Our model is a little more sophisticated than that of Condorcet in two ways: signals and
abilities. Condorcet’s voters get a binary signal, for A or for B. Our jurors get a signal s in the
interval [−1,+1], with higher signals giving a higher probability of A. The signal s = 0 is neutral
and useless, as A and B remain equally likely after such a signal. In analogy with Condorcet’s
probability p (that the binary signal is correct) our jurors have an ability in the interval [0, 1],
which is proportional to the probability of A given a positive signal s, 0 < s ≤ 1. An ability of
0 makes that probability 1/2, the same as the a priori probability and hence useless (no ability
at all). Jurors of higher ability have, in general, more useful private information. When a juror
of given ability comes to vote, he will vote for the alternative, A or B, that he views as more
likely, given prior voting and his private signal s. This type of voting, called honest voting,
models the jurors as experts who have known abilities by reputation. They wish to vote for
the alternative that turns out to be true, assuming Nature is eventually revealed. This would
be true if they are making short term predictions (say weather or the economy). This type
of voting by experts was introduced by Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001). Overall, the model of
signals and abilities used here is the same linear signal model introduced in Alpern and Chen
(2017b) in a simpler voting model and is similar in spirit to the discrete signal model of Alpern
and Chen (2017a). The way in which a juror’s signal and ability affect his judgement of the
probability of A is described fully in Section 4.
Given the above model, we are able to address four questions about the comparative relia-
bility of different voting schemes or voting orders. The main question addressed in this article
is the optimal voting order for jurors of different abilities. Putting higher ability jurors first
is more likely to have them vote before a majority verdict is established, but also may create
negative herding effects. We also consider when sequential honest voting, where jurors can take
into account previous voting, is better or worse than simultaneous voting (or secret ballot)as
in the Condorcet model. We also answer the question of whether, for fixed average ability,
a more heterogeneous or homogeneous jury has higher reliability when voting in the optimal
sequential order. Finally, we ask when sequential honest voting is optimal, or strategic, in that
it maximizes the reliability of the verdict. If not, the jurors might be incentivized to jointly
modify their voting thresholds to produce a better verdict, which could mean possibly voting
for the alternative that a juror views as less likely. This might be accomplished by giving all
jurors a reward later, if majority verdict turns out to be correct, or perhaps by giving them
stock in the company making the decision. Since we are dealing with majority verdicts and,
for a single member jury, all the above distinctions are meaningless, we consider a jury of three
experts, where we find sharp answers to all of our above questions. For medium-sized juries,
say five to eleven, we propose in Section 10 an analog of the optimal rank ordering of abilities
for three-member juries.
We note that while electorates in preference voting are typically large, juries in information
voting are typically small, and often of size three, such as refereeing team in tennis or boxing,
appellate levels in legal decisions, doctors giving second or third opinions on the necessity of an
operation. For juries of size three we are able to answer all of our above questions regarding
comparative reliability, as follows.
1. Optimal voting order (Theorem 2). For juries of distinct abilities, the unique voting
order that maximizes the reliability of the verdict for honest sequential voting is given
as follows: the median ability expert should vote first, then the expert of highest ability,
and finally the expert of least ability. (This order was suggested by numerical work in
Alpern and Chen (2017a).) This is our main result and by far the hardest to prove. See
also the introduction of the more general Ascending-Descending Order (ADO) ordering
in Section 10: The median ability juror votes first, then the voting is in increasing order
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up to the highest ability. After the highest votes, the remaining jurors vote in decreasing
order of ability.
2. Seniority vs. anti-seniority voting orders (Theorem 4). The seniority voting order
(decreasing order of ability) has a strictly higher reliability of the verdict than the anti-
seniority order (increasing order of ability), unless all jurors have the same ability.
3. Sequential vs. simultaneous voting (Theorem 5). When the abilities of the jurors
are sufficiently homogeneous, simultaneous voting has higher reliability than sequential
voting. But when the abilities are sufficiently heterogeneous, honest sequential voting (in
the optimal order) has higher reliability. (We provide suitable indices of homogeneity and
heterogeneity.)
4. Effect of diversity on reliability (Theorem 6). For a jury of fixed average ability,
reliability is an increasing function of the heterogeneity index.
5. When is honest sequential voting strategic, that is, (perfectly) optimal? (The-
orem 7). When the abilities of the jurors are sufficiently heterogeneous, honest sequential
voting in the optimal order is strategic in that it maximizes reliability with respect to any
(not just honest) strategy thresholds.
To see how these results aid an organization, which has to make a binary decision, consider
that the organization has hired three experts of distinct abilities and wishes to determine the
optimal voting mechanism. First, suppose it has no additional funds to incentivize strategic
voting, so voting is honest. If the abilities of the fixed set of expert are sufficiently homogeneous,
it should keep the voting silent (or simultaneous) by not allowing later voters to know the
results of earlier voting (Theorem 5). (This is done for preference voting in US elections, but
for different reasons.) If the ability set is sufficiently heterogeneous, then later voters should
be told the outcome of earlier votes (Theorem 5) and they should vote in the order given by
Theorem 2. We note that other variations are possible, for example, later voters could be told
the votes of only some of the earlier voters. If the jury is not fixed, then Theorem 6 suggests
that, assuming the cost of an expert juror is increasing in ability, heterogeneous juries might
be preferable. Finally, we consider whether it might be advantageous to pay a bonus to each
expert for a correct jury (majority) decision, assuming the correctness of the verdict becomes
common knowledge in the near future, as with weather predictions. In general, this will be a
cost-benefit problem, but Theorem 7 shows that such payments are wasteful if the ability set is
sufficiently heterogeneous.
For larger juries of odd size n = 2m+1, we propose the Ascending-Descending Order (ADO),
where the most able m+ 1 jurors vote first in increasing ability order and then the least able m
jurors vote in descending ability order. We already know from Theorem 2 that ADO is optimal
for n = 3. Using simulation techniques, we establish that the ADO is an excellent heuristic
(and possibly optimal) for n = 5 and n = 7.
To conclude the section, we remark that our problem can be viewed as a simple optimization
problem faced by a decision maker, who has an unordered set of people to form a jury to help
him make a binary decision. He wants to arrange their voting order so as to make the majority
decision of the jury as reliable as possible. On the other hand, we can also view our problem
more game theoretically as a Stackelberg game or principal agent problem. First, we are given
an unordered set of jurors. The Principal, who moves first, selects an order in which they must
vote. He wins the game (payoff 1; otherwise payoff 0) if the majority verdict is the true state of
Nature. Then the jurors vote openly in the order selected by the Principal. In this sub-game, a
juror wins (payoff 1; otherwise payoff 0) if his vote is the same as the true state of Nature. That
3
is, the Principal cares only about the correctness of the verdict, while the jurors care only about
the correctness of their own votes. In the sub-game, honest voting is exactly the unique Nash
equilibrium. In fact, no juror can improve his expected payoff (probability he votes correctly)
by changing from honesty, if the prior voters stick to honest voting. Thus it is stronger than
the usual definition of Nash equilibrium.
2 Literature
The celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785) is concerned with a model with an
odd number n of jurors who receive independent binary signals for one of two states of Nature.
Each juror receives the correct signal with the same probability p. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
(CJT) states that if each juror votes his signal, the probability that the majority vote is correct
goes to 1 as n approaches to infinity if p > 1/2. There is a large body of literature on extensions
and discussions of this result. In this paper we are interested in extensions to sequential voting
of heterogeneous ability jurors, where the jurors vote in order, with knowledge of all previous
votes. In particularly we are interested in work related to voting order.
In Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) jurors have heterogeneous abilities (as in this paper), who
care only about being right (they are “experts”, with reputations to uphold), rather than about
obtaining a correct verdict. We call them honest voters. The main difference between their
model and ours in this paper is that they retain the Condorcet assumption about binary signals.
They talk about the problem of groupthink, herding and conformism, the last also is discussed
in terms of committee decisions regarding the “secretary problem” in Alpern and Baston (2016).
Dekel and Piccione (2000) mainly consider the equilibria of simultaneous versus sequential
voting, but they do make an important comment on voting order of heterogeneous jurors” in
their Conclusions (p. 48):
“. . . if voters are endowed ex ante with differential information (some voters can be
better informed that others( knowing which voters voted in favor and which against
can affect the choice of a later voter. It can be shown that, in a common-value and
two signal environment (as in Sec. IIIC above), if the player’s signals are completely
ordered (in the sense of Blackwell), then it is optimal to have the better informed
vote earlier. This provides an interesting contrast to the findings of Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2001). They obtain the opposite optimal order in an environment in which
information providers care not about the outcome but about appearing to be well
informed. It is not difficult, however, to construct examples in which having the
best-informed voter vote first is not optimal. Hence it seems unlikely that general
insights into this question can be obtained.”
The point of this paper is that we are indeed able to obtain general insights into this question.
Ali et al. (2008) discuss the optimal voting order of experts and cite examples in which courts
of judges follow either anti-seniority (increasing order of ability, in our terminology) or seniority
(decreasing order) orders, respectively, in the ancient Sanhedrin court and in the contemporary
American Supreme Court. Voting order in selection committees is analyzed in Alpern, Gal and
Solan (2010), but there voting is by veto.
A sequential voting model, with discrete but non binary signals, was introduced by Alpern
and Chen (2017a). Ability levels were also discrete, so propositions about which ability orderings
are best could be obtained by exhaustive search among the finite number of possibilities. Most
of that paper is about strategic voting where voters wish to obtain the correct majority verdict,
even if this means voting for an alternative which a juror believes to be less likely. For the
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question of the optimal ability ordering of three jurors with abilities a < b < c, that paper
shows by exhaustive search that b, a, c and b, c, a are the optimal orderings (the order of the
last two voters in strategic voting does not matter). For honest voting, it is shown for the finite
number of cases considered, that the ordering b, c, a is optimal. This is the observation that led
us to attempt the general algebraic proof, where a, b and c are real numbers, that is given here.
The first algebraic proof of this kind was obtained recently by Alpern and Chen (2017b) for a
simpler voting model, where first two jurors vote simultaneously and then the remaining (third)
juror casts the deciding vote if there is a tie. This is a much simpler model algebraically as
their are only two voting thresholds to consider (for the casting voter), depending on whether
the the more able juror voted A or B. Alpern and Chen (2017a) also consider larger juries,
up to size 13. It uses simulation to compare randomly generated juries, which vote honestly in
increasing, decreasing or random ability order. For all these sizes, decreasing order has higher
reliability than random, and random has higher reliability than increasing order.
For a simpler voting model with n-1 jurors voting simultaneously, followed by a tie breaking
vote (if necessary) of the remaining voter, Alpern and Chen (2017b) showed that for n = 3 the
voter of median ability should have the casting vote, with honest voting.
A related literature compares the efficacy of sequential versus simultaneous voting. A poten-
tial problem with the former is the possibility of herding and information cascades, especially
when more able voters are at the beginning of the sequence. Here, voters ignore their own
private information to vote instead based on a consensus achieved by earlier voters. On the
other hand, with sequential voting each juror has more information to go on. Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) explore the probability of informational cascades and also the
probability that they converge on an incorrect outcome. They explain many recognized phe-
nomena based on this convergence. In this respect, Ottaviani and Sorensen find that “increasing
the quality of some experts on the committee can exacerbate herd behavior and hence decrease
the amount of information collected by the decision maker”. A more recent approach to this
problem, by computer scientists exploring sequential voting in the context of what are known as
social recommendation systems (such as Amazon product valuations, written with knowledge
of previous customer’s evaluations) is given by Celis, Krafft and Kobe (2016). They analyze
student-reported learning and find that “sequential voting systems can surface better content
than systems that elicit independent votes”. A related paper, which deals with sequential eval-
uations, is Besbes and Scarsini (2016) and considers the possibility of only revealing the mean
of prior evaluations. This brings the suggestion of varying our model so that jurors know the
prior unascribed vote (such as three votes for A and one for B) without revealing how each
prior juror individually voted. This model will be for our future work.
Baharad et al. (2012) consider two problems related to our work. First they consider the use
of prior voting records of jurors to evaluate what we call ability. Also, they consider decision
rules other than majority verdict and present one that work well in a certain context.
3 Simple results on sequential juries
As a warm-up, this section serves the purpose of giving some simple and intuitive results for
optimally reliable voting orders on heterogeneous sequential juries, without resort to the full
model that we provided in the preceding section. We first consider Condorcet jurors, who
are defined as receiving binary signals (for A or for B) and then we consider what we call
sophisticated jurors, who receive real number signals in the interval [−1,+1].
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3.1 Condorcet jurors
We begin with a simple model with three jurors, who we call jurors J1, J2 and J3 in terms
of voting order and get correct binary signals s ∈ {A,B} with probabilities p1, p2 and p3,
respectively. We also write {p1, p2, p3} = {p, q, r} where p ≤ q ≤ r, and also call the jurors
P, Q and R in terms of ability. So if the juror of highest ability votes first, then we have J1
= R. We similarly label the signals received by the jurors as {s1, s2, s3} or {sp, sq, sr}. For
example, signal s1 is correct with probability p1. Given the three signals {sp, sq, sr}, it is easy
to calculate the most likely state of Nature, which we call the Full Information Solution (FIS).
Clearly, such a state is either sr (dictator verdict) or sp = sq 6= sr (majority verdict). If sr = A
and sp = sq = B, the posterior probability of A is given by
r(1− p)(1− q)
r(1− p)(1− q) + (1− r)pq .
A simple calculation shows that the signal A of juror R is more likely to be the state of Nature,
r(1− p)(1− q)
r(1− p)(1− q) + (1− r)pq ≥
1
2
,
if and only if
r ≥ p¯ ≡ pq
1− p− q + 2pq .
Proposition 1. The FIS can be obtained from honest sequential majority voting for all ability
triples if and only if the highest ability juror votes second.
Proof. If the highest ability juror R votes first (R = J1), then J2 and then J3 will copy his vote
in a cascade. This will fail to choose the FIS if r < p¯ and J2 and J3 both have the opposite
signal to R, since in this case the FIS is s2 = s3, while the verdict is s1. If R votes last (R =
J3) and r > p¯, then R’s signal sr is the FIS. However, the first two jurors J1 and J2 will vote
their signals, creating a majority verdict for their signals, which might not be sr. Hence a jury
where R votes first or last does not always give the FIS.
On the other hand, suppose that R votes second (R = J2). Then J1 and J3 are P and Q,
in some order. So J1 and J2 = R vote their signals. If they are the same, that is the verdict
and the FIS. Otherwise, the last juror J3 votes with full information (about the signals) and
can choose the verdict, so he chooses the FIS. 
Thus with binary signals, the FIS can be obtained for all ability triples if we always have
the highest ability juror vote second. If he does not vote second, then for some abilities the
FIS will not be obtained. The voting positions of the lower ability jurors do not matter. We
shall see that for sophisticate jurors, the first observation holds (best for highest ability juror
to vote second); however, the second observation no longer holds — it is best for the weakest
ability juror to vote last. For sophisticated jurors, who receive continuous signals, signals are
not revealed through voting. So it is unreasonable to expect that the FIS can be obtained.
3.2 Sophisticated jurors
We now consider jurors who receive not binary signals, but signals in the interval [−1,+1]. For
each juror, higher signals give a higher posteriori probability that Nature is in state A, with a
signal of 0 leaving A and B equiprobable. A juror’s signal distribution depends on the state of
Nature and on his ability a, a number between 0 and 1, in such a way that the probability pa
that his signal is correct (positive when Nature is A) is given by the equation
pa = 1/2 + a/4. (1)
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Thus our notion of ability is a proxy for the Condorcet p number in that it is positive linearly
related. The signal and ability model will be formally defined in the next section, but this is
all the reader needs now to follow our informal argument for Proposition 2. We assume that
the jurors vote sequentially and that each juror votes for the state of Nature he views as more
likely, given prior voting and his private signal. We call this honest voting. When a jury votes
in a fixed order of abilities, there is a probability, called the reliability (of the verdict), that the
majority vote is for the actual state of Nature. In general, this reliability depends on which of
the six possible voting orders are used. Our main result, Theorem 2, will establish that there is
an optimal order (one maximizing reliability) which is independent of the actual abilities and
just depends on their rank, namely: median, high, low. We now prove a much easier result,
which states that if there is an optimal rank order of this type, it much be the stated one. The
proof of Proposition 2 can be understood without all the details of the ability-signal model of
Section 4, but the reader may wish to reread the proof again after that section.
Proposition 2. Suppose we label the abilities of the three jurors as a, b, c, with 0 ≤ a < b <
c ≤ 1. If there is a unique voting order which maximizes reliability that is independent of the
actual values of a, b, c, then it must be b first, then c, then a.
Proof. First suppose c is close to 1 and a and b are both close to 0, what we call “two yokels
and a boffin”, where the boffin has ability c and the dumber an smarter yokel have respective
abilities a and b. We establish in this case the the stated order maximizes reliability, so if some
order is optimal for all juries, it must be this one.
With our assumption of honest voting, either yokel voting after the boffin will have proba-
bility about 3/4 ≈ pc that the boffin’s vote is correct (even after seeing their own pretty useless
signals), and hence will copy the vote of the boffin. So if the boffin does not vote last, the relia-
bility of the jury will be pc, which is close to 3/4. On the other hand, if the boffin votes last, the
verdict may already be decided before he comes to vote, if the two yokels vote alike, in which
case the verdict will be right with probability 1/2, as the yokels have no useful information.
The yokels will vote alike with some probability q, which is at least 1/2, since they vote alike
when they get signals of the same sign, which occurs with probability close to 1/2. Hence the
reliability when the boffin votes last is approximates
q
(
1
2
)
+ (1− q) pc <
(
1
2
)(
1
2
)
+
(
1
2
)
pc < pc,
as pc ≈ 3/4. Hence the boffin cannot vote last in an optimal voting order.
If the boffin votes first, the reliability is exactly the probability pc that he gets it right. But
suppose the boffin’s signal is very very close to 0, so he still views A and B as equiprobable.
In this case he would prefer to vote second so that he could follow the vote of the first voter,
of ability x ∈ {a, b}, and make the correct vote with probability px > 1/2 rather than with
probability 1/2. So it is better for the boffin to vote second than to vote first. However now
it is better for the smarter boffin to vote first, so that px in the previous argument is in fact
pb rather than pa. So with two yokels and a boffin, the optimal ordering is smarter yokel, then
boffin, then dumber yokel, or (b, a, c). 
We note that this is a very special case of our main result, Theorem 2, which says that the
ordering (b, a, c) is always optimal. Neither that result or any other result requires Proposition 2,
which is why we are content with the above fairly informal proof of Proposition 2.
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4 Signals, abilities and voting thresholds
In both the Condorcet model and in our model, there are two equiprobable states of Nature,
called A and B. In the Condorcet model, private information of jurors is in the form of a
binary signal {A,B}. The ability of a juror to guess the true state is given as a probability,
called p, that the signal received corresponds to the actual state of Nature. This probability p
ranges between 1/2 (useless information) and 1 (definite information). In our model, private
information of a juror comes in the form of a continuous signal s, which ranges between −1
and +1, with signal 0 neutral, negative signals indicating B is more likely and positive signals
indicating that A is more likely. Our analog of Condorcet’s probability p is a number, called
the ability a, which ranges from 0 to 1. The number a is linearly related to the conditional
probability p of A, given a positive signal s. In particular, the conditional probability of A,
given that a juror of ability a receives a signal s above a threshold τ , τ ∈ [−1,+1], is given by
pτ = Pr (A | s ≥ τ) = 1
2
+
1 + τ
4
a. (2)
This generalizes equation (1). For a juror of ability a = 0, this means that p, or more generally
pτ , is 1/2, the same as the a priori probability of A. Thus a juror of ability 0 essentially has
no ability, his signal (his private information) is useless. On the other hand, if a juror has
maximum ability a = 1 and receives a signal above a threshold τ that is very close to +1, his
conditional probability of A approaches certainty (pt ≈ 1). The fact that the signal is above
the threshold τ = −1 says nothing about the signal (they are always at least −1) and indeed
p−1 = 1/2, the same as the a priori probability of A. Thus in our model, the ability level a is
a proxy for Condorcet’s probability p, but in a more general context of continuous rather than
binary signals. We now describe the signal distribution which gives these outcomes (1) and (2).
This continuous signal-ability model has been used before in the literature (e.g., Alpern and
Chen, 2017b).
4.1 Signal distributions
We assume two states of Nature A and B, considered as negation of A, with a priori probability
of A given by Pr (A) = θ0. To simplify the analysis we will assume the equiprobable case
θ0 = 1/2, although our results are robust for θ0 values around 1/2. Individuals have private
information about the state of Nature modeled as a signal s in the signal interval [−1,+1].
Positive signals are indications of A; negative signals B. The signal s = 0 is neutral. Higher
positive signals indicate A more strongly; similarly for negative signals and B. Thus a stronger
signal is one with a higher absolute value.
Individual jurors have an ability a in the ability interval [0, 1], where individuals of higher
ability are generally (but not always) able to make better guesses about the state of Nature.
We will define our ability-signal model in such a way that the conditional probability of state A
given a positive signal s > 0 is proportional to the juror’s ability a. In this way our definition
of ability is analogous to Condorcet’s definition of p as the probability that the binary signal
A corresponds to Nature being in state A. When Nature is in state A (resp. B), jurors receive
independent signals s ∈ [−1, 1] with probability density given by fa(s) (resp. ga(s)) if they have
ability a. We make the simplest nontrivial assumption on fa(s) and ga(s), namely that they
are linear in s. The slope of the density functions fa(s) and ga(s) for a juror of ability a is
proportional to a. Given that fa and ga(s) are density functions on [−1,+1], they take the
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following form:
fa(s) = (1 + as)/2, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is A;
ga(s) = (1− as)/2, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is B.
It is easily checked that fa(·) and ga(·) defined above are indeed density functions for any
a ∈ [0, 1]. The probability of a correct signal, that is positive when Nature is A, is the area
under the A line (and above the s axis) to the right of s = 0. When a = 1/2, this area is 1/2,
showing that a juror with ability a = 0 is just guessing (by flipping a fair coin to determine the
state of Nature).
The corresponding cumulative distributions of the signal s when Nature is A or B are given
by {
Fa(s) = (s+ 1)(as− a+ 2)/4, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is A;
Ga(s) = (s+ 1)(a− as+ 2)/4, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is B. (3)
Given prior probability θ0 of A and only his signal s, a juror of ability a has a posterior
probability θ′ of A, as given by Bayes’ Law:
θ′ = Pr (A | s) = θ0fa(s)
θ0fa(s) + (1− θ0)ga(s) =
θ0 + asθ0
2asθ0 − as+ 1 =
as+ 1
2
(if θ0 = 1/2). (4)
Note that for a juror of ability 0, we have θ′ = θ0 for any received signal s, reinforcing our
notion that ability 0 is no ability at all. A juror of ability 0 can do no more than guess. If we
wish to view our juror of ability a as a Condorcet juror, we would say that his probability of a
correct signal (positive when Nature is A or negative when Nature is B) is given by∫ 1
0
fa(s) ds = 1− Fa (0) = 1
2
+
1
4
a,
due to the equiprobability (and hence symmetry) of A and B, which establishes (1). The more
general result (2), for signals s ≥ τ , arbitrary thresholds τ and θ = 1/2, is established by
Pr (A|s ≥ τ) = (1/2) (1− Fa (τ))
(1/2) (1− Fa (τ)) + (1/2) (1−Ga (τ))
=
1
2
+
1 + τ
4
a.
4.2 Strategy and jury reliability
A strategy for a juror is a threshold τ , depending on previous voting, if any, such that the juror
votes A with signal s ≥ τ and B with signal s < τ . A strategy profile is a list of strategies for
each juror.
A strategy profile is said honest (or naive) if the thresholds are such that every juror votes
for the alternative that he believes is more likely, given the a priori probability of A, his private
signal, and any prior voting. In taking into consideration prior voting, each voter assumes
previous voters are honest. (NB: the definition of honest voting is recursive.) Honest voting is
the unique Nash equilibrium in the voting game.
We define the reliability of a voting scheme as the probability that the majority verdict
is correct under this voting scheme, where a juror wins if his own vote is correct and loses
otherwise. With equiprobable alternatives, a simple symmetry argument shows this is the same
as the probability of majority verdict A when Nature is in state A. We ask the simple question:
Given a set of n abilities, which sequential voting order of these abilities will maximize the
reliability?
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5 Thresholds and reliability functions
In this section we determine the thresholds (on his private signal) that an honest voter adopts,
based on previous voting. Using these results, we determine the reliability (of the verdict) for
a jury of honest voters of given abilities who vote in a given order. In this and the next section
we signpost the main steps of the algebraic calculations, with details left in the appendix.
5.1 Threshold determination
Consider the problem faced by the voter of ability a, given a priori probability θ of A before
he looks at his signal s. What is his honest threshold? His posteriori probability of A is given
by θ′ as given by equation (4) with θ0 replaced by θ. Hence
θ′ =
θ + asθ
2asθ − as+ 1 .
The honest threshold τ is the value of s for which θ′ = 1/2, or
1
2
=
θ + asθ
2asθ − as+ 1 .
Solving for s and making this value the honest threshold τ gives τ = (1 − 2θ)/a. Of course, if
(1 − 2θ)/a > 1, this means always vote B (same as threshold τ = 1), and if (1 − 2θ)/a < −1
this means always vote A (same as threshold τ = −1). Such phenomenon is known as herding
behavior, where agents ignore their own private information and follow prior agents. We can
take the limit as a → 0+ to make the same arguments if a = 0. Therefore, the threshold of a
voter of ability a with a priori probability θ of A is given as follows:
τa(θ) =

0, if θ = 1/2;
−1, if a < 2θ − 1 and θ > 1/2;
+1, if a < 1− 2θ and θ < 1/2;
(1− 2θ)/a, otherwise.
(5)
Note that τa(θ) is well defined for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1].
5.2 Thresholds for a duo under unanimity rule
Consider a jury of two jurors. They vote sequentially under unanimity rule: unless both votes
go for B, the other state A will be the verdict. Let the two voters have abilities of b and c in
the voting order. Before the two voters start to vote, the a priori probability of A is θ.
It is evidence from Section 5.1 that the threshold of the first voter is y¯ = τb(θ), as given in
(5). If he votes for A, then the jury verdict is A and there is no need for the second voter to
vote. Otherwise, given the first vote is for B (which implies that y¯ > −1), according to Bayes
Law, the second voter has an updated a priori probability of A as follows:
θ¯ =
θFb(y¯)
θFb(y¯) + (1− θ)Gb(y¯) .
Consequently, the threshold of the last voter is z¯ = τc(θ¯).
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5.3 Thresholds for a triple under majority rule
We are particularly interested in a jury of three members under majority rule. We determine
their honest voting thresholds. Let us fix their voting order at (a, b, c). It is immediate from
Equation (5) that the threshold of the first voter is x = 0 with his a priori probability θ = 1/2.
Let us determine the posterior probability θ(A), given the prior voting of ability a and
threshold x = 0 is A. Then Bayes’ Law implies
θ(A) =
1− Fa(0)
(1− Fa(0)) + (1−Ga(0)) =
2 + a
4
. (6)
Similarly, if the prior voting is B, then the posteriori probability is
θ(B) =
2− a
4
. (7)
According to (5), the honest threshold yA for the second voter with prior voting of A is
yA = yA(a, b) =
{ −1, if b ≤ a/2,
−a/(2b), otherwise. (8)
Symmetrically, we have
yB = yB(a, b) = −yA(a, b). (9)
Remark 1. From (8) and (9) we see that if the ability of the second voter is so small that
b ≤ a/2, then he will ignore his own signal and vote the same way as the first voter. This
phenomenon is the so-called herding. For this reason, we denote
H2 = {(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2 : b ≤ a/2} (10)
as the set of voting sequences with which the second voter herds. If this happens, then there is
no need for the last voter to vote.
Now let us calculate the voting thresholds for the third voter, assuming he does vote, which
implies that (a, b) 6∈ H2. Bayes update for the probability of A after two votes, first A and then
B, is given as follows:
θ(AB) =
θ(A)Fb(yA)
θ(A)Fb(yA) + (1− θ(A))Gb(yA) , (11)
where θ(A), θ(B) and yA are given in (6), (7) and (8), respectively. Therefore, a straightforward
calculation gives the threshold zAB of the third voter as follows:
zAB = zAB(a, b, c) =
{
1, if c ≤ ρ(a, b),
ρ(a, b)/c, otherwise,
(12)
where
ρ(a, b) =
2(2b− a)
8− a2 − 2ab, (13)
which is clearly positive. Symmetrically we have
zBA(a, b, c) = −zAB(a, b, c). (14)
Remark 2. As in Remark 1, from (12) and (14) we see that if the ability of the third voter is
so small that c ≤ ρ(a, b), then he will ignore his own signal and follow the vote of the previous
juror. For this reason, we denote
H3 = {(a, b, c) ∈ [0, 1]3 : (a, b) 6∈ H2 and c ≤ ρ(a, b)} (15)
as the set of voting sequences with which the third voter votes and herds.
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5.4 An illustrative example
Let us illustrate how our model works and how the verdict of a jury of fixed abilities and fixed
signals can depend on the voting order. We take an example with a boffin and two (unequal)
yokels, as described in the proof of Proposition 2.
Assume we have a juror of ability a = 0.05 who has signal sa = −0.5, a juror of ability
b = 0.1 with signal sb = +0.5 and a juror of ability c = 0.9 with signal sc = −0.01. Suppose A
and B are equiprobable. Suppose the voting is in ability order (c, b, a) or (c, a, b). The boffin
of ability c begins the voting and he votes B because his honest threshold is 0 according to (5)
and his signal is negative. After seeing this vote, the posterior probability of A is given by (7)
as
θ′ = θ(B) =
2− c
4
=
2− 0.9
4
= 0.275.
For the next voter, of ability x ∈ {a, b}, we have x < 1 − 2θ′ = 1 − 2(0.275) = 0.45, so
according to the third line of (5) his threshold is +1 and hence he votes B (herding). The same
reasoning holds for the last juror (though his vote does not affect the verdict). Thus the voting
is (B,B,B), with majority verdict B, for voting orders (c, b, a) and (c, a, b).
Now assume the voting order is (b, c, a), which we later show has optimal reliability. The
first juror votes A, since he has a positive signal and his honest threshold is 0 according to (5).
After his vote we have by (6) that the posterior probability of A is given by
θ′ = θ(A) =
2 + 0.1
4
= 0.525.
Since the ability of the boffin, c = 0.9, is larger than 2θ′ − 1 = 2(0.525) − 1 = 0.05, his honest
threshold is given by the last line of (5) as (1− 2θ′)/0.9 = (1− 2(0.525))/0.9 < −0.05 and his
signal is −0.01, so he votes A. This already determines the majority verdict as A. In fact the
last voter herds and hence the voting is (A,A,A). This example shows how it may help the
boffin of ability 0.9 to go after a low ability voter, in the case that his own signal is close to 0.
5.5 Explicit reliability functions
We will study juries of both general sizes and three in particular. For a jury of general size, we
look closely at the situation where the last two jurors of the jury need to vote.
5.5.1 Duo under unanimity rule
Let us calculate the reliability under the same setting as in Section 5.2 for a two-member jury
under unanimity rule (for B). Let q¯A(θ; b, c) (resp. q¯B(θ; b, c)) denote the probability of verdict
A (resp. B) when Nature is A (resp. B) and let Q¯(θ; b, c) denote the overall reliability of the
jury verdict, both with voting order of (b, c). Then it is clear that
q¯A(θ; b, c) = (1− Fb(y¯)) + Fb(y¯)(1− Fc(z¯)),
q¯B(θ; b, c) = Gb(y¯)Gc(z¯),
Q¯(θ; b, c) = θq¯A(θ; b, c) + (1− θ)q¯B(θ; b, c),
(16)
where y¯ and z¯ are calculated as in Section 5.2. Explicit expression of the reliability function
Q¯(θ; b, c) is provided in Appendix A.1.
5.5.2 Triple under majority rule
We now evaluate reliability Q(a, b, c), the probability of a correct verdict, where the jurors have
abilities a, b and c (in voting order) and the first voter has honest thresholds x = 0. Let qA
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(resp. qB) denote the probability of majority verdict A (resp. B) when Nature is A (resp. B).
Then for an arbitrary a priori probability θ0 of A we have that the reliability Q(a, b, c) is given
by
Q(a, b, c) = θ0 qA(a, b, c) + (1− θ0) qB(a, b, c).
Hence with neutral alternatives θ0 = 1/2, we have
Q(a, b, c) =
1
2
(qA(a, b, c) + qB(a, b, c)),
and symmetry gives the simpler formula
Q(a, b, c) = qA(a, b, c) = qB(a, b, c). (17)
The formula for qA(a, b, c) is given by summing up the probabilities of voting patterns AA,
ABA and BAA when Nature is A. Thus
qA(a, b, c) = (1− Fa(0))(1− Fb(yA)) + (1− Fa(0))Fb(yA)(1− Fc(zAB)))
+ Fa(0)(1− Fb(yB))(1− Fc(zBA))), (18)
with a similar formula for qB. Again with some straightforward calculations and recalling our
definitions (10) and (15), we can get
Q(a, b, c) =

(2 + a)/4, if (a, b) ∈ H2;
q0(a, b), if (a, b, c) ∈ H3;
q(a, b, c), if (a, b, c) ∈ S;
(19)
where S = [0, 1]3 \ (H2 ∪H3), and
q0(a, b) =
a2 + 4b(b+ 2)
16b
,
and
q(a, b, c) =
4(2b− a)3 + 4(8− a2 − 2ab)(16b+ (a+ 2b)2)c+ (2b− a)(8− a2 − 2ab)2c2
128b(8− a2 − 2ab)c .
Remark 3. The ability sequence cube [0, 1]3 is partitioned into H2, H3 and S and herding takes
place if and only if the ability sequence falls into the former two subsets. It is easy to check
that, if each juror has an ability more than 1/2 (i.e., a, b, c > 1/2), then (a, b, c) ∈ S and hence
there is no herding.
6 Unanimity rule for verdict
Although we are mainly concerned with the reliability of majority verdicts under sequential
voting, the related question of unanimous verdicts will be useful to partly resolve here, as it
has an impact on the analysis of majority verdict theory. So, we consider sequential voting of n
jurors, where the “default” verdict is A in the sense that B is the verdict only if it gets all the
votes and a single vote for A results in verdict A. Such unanimity rule has been considered in
the organizational studies literature, e.g., Romme (2004). In some courts of law a unanimous
vote is required to convict. Such a requirement has been suggested for capital cases to reduce
the number of false convictions. However, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) have shown that,
for strategic voting (to be discussed in more detail in Section 9) there is no such reduction when
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unanimity is required for conviction. Ben-Yashar and Danziger (2016) show how to allocate
heterogeneous ability experts (with binary signals) to disjoint juries which adopt the unanimity
rule. Most of the study of unanimous voting is done in a simultaneous rather than sequential
manner discussed here.
Here is an example where sequential unanimous “voting” takes place. Suppose a patient
considers having a major operation. It is important enough to get a second opinion. The patient
will have the operation carried out only if both doctors recommend it. The second doctor to
give an opinion will know the recommendation of the first doctor and will know his reputation
as well. In what order should the patient query the two doctors (in terms of their abilities) to
have the most reliable verdict?
6.1 Optimal voting order for a duo
The following lemma says that the aforementioned patient should go to the more able doctor
first.
Lemma 1. Given any a priori probability θ of alternative A and a jury of n = 2 jurors of
abilities b, c ∈ [0, 1] with b < c, under unanimity voting rule (for B), the jury reliability Q¯(θ; c, b)
of voting order (c, b) is at least as high as that of voting order (b, c).
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
6.2 Application to any jury of general size
Let us apply Lemma 1 to a jury of any size, whether under the unanimity rule or majority rule.
Consider the situation where a verdict has not been reached before the last two jurors have the
chance to vote. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a jury of odd size n with fixed abilities and honest voting for a majority
verdict. We allow any a priori probability θ of state A. Given any ability order of the first n−2
jurors, maximum reliability of the majority verdict is achieved if the ability of the last to vote
is not higher than that of the penultimate voter.
Proof. First note that if a majority verdict is reached before the last two jurors vote, their
voting order does not affect the verdict. There is a positive probability that the verdict will not
be reached by then, in which case one alternative, say A, has one more vote than B. In this
case, the remaining voting (of the last two jurors) requires unanimity to reach verdict B. By
Lemma 1, the decreasing ability order maximizes the reliability of the unanimous vote of the
last two, and hence also of the majority vote of all n jurors. 
We note that the above result of optimal order also holds for the relative abilities of the
last two jurors in unanimous voting of n jurors, for any n ≥ 2, without assuming that n is odd.
Similar arguments, but with different conclusions, were given in Alpern and Chen (2017a) for
strategic voting.
7 Comparisons of voting orders
In this section we first consider how reliability changes when two jurors switch their voting
positions (Theorem 1, Propositions 3 and 4) and we then combine these results to determine
the optimal voting order of three jurors (Theorem 2).
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7.1 Order of the first two voters
The following proposition states that, fixing any last voter, starting with a lower-ability voter
always has a higher reliability.
Proposition 3. Under sequential-majority scheme suppose that A and B are equiprobable and
we have three honest jurors of abilities a, b, c ∈ [0, 1]. If a < b, then Q(a, b, c) > Q(b, a, c).
Proof. According to (19), the first case there does not apply to Q(a, b, c). We consider c ≤ ρ(a, b)
here and leave the other case of c > ρ(a, b) to Part 2 of Appendix A.3, as the proof is very
similar. Let ∆1(a, b, c) ≡ Q(a, b, c)−Q(b, a, c). If (b, a) ∈ H2, then
∆1(a, b, c) = q0(a, b)− b+ 2
4
=
a2
16b
> 0.
If (b, a, c) ∈ H3, then
∆1(a, b, c) = q0(a, b)− q0(b, a) = (b− a)(3ab− a
2 − b2)
16ab
> 0,
since 3ab − a2 − b2 is clearly increasing in a and hence it is more than the value when a is
replaced by b/2. If (b, a, c) ∈ S, then
∆1(a, b, c) = q0(a, b)− q(b, a, c) = f1(a, b, c)
128abc(8− b2 − 2ab) ,
where
f1(a, b, c) = − 4(2a− b)3b+ 4(8− 2ab− b2)(2a3 − 4a2b
+ 4ab2 − b3)c− b(2a− b)(8− 2ab− b2)2c2.
In Part 1 of Appendix A.3 we prove f1(a, b, c) > 0 subject to (b, a, c) ∈ S, (a, b, c) ∈ H3 and
a < b (i.e., ρ(b, a) < c ≤ ρ(a, b), b/2 < a < b and a, b, c ∈ [0, 1]). 
7.2 Order of the two end-voters
Our next proposition establishes that there is a better voting order applicable to all possible
pairs of abilities of the two end-voters in any three-member jury, regardless of what ability the
middle voter is.
Proposition 4. Under sequential-majority scheme suppose that A and B are equiprobable and
we have three honest jurors of abilities a, b, c ∈ [0, 1]. If a < b, then Q(b, c, a) > Q(a, c, b) for
any c.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
7.3 Optimal voting order
Combining the three pairwise comparisons of Theorem 1, Propositions 3 and 4, we obtain the
following main result.
Theorem 2. For juries of distinct abilities 0 < a < b < c ≤ 1, the unique voting order that
maximizes the reliability of the verdict for honest sequential majority voting is given by (b, c, a).
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7.4 Do abler juries give better verdicts?
Suppose we increase the abilities of jurors, keeping the same voting order. Does this increase
the reliability of their verdict? Not necessarily. The jury (1/4, 1/8, 1/2) is abler than the jury
(0, 1/8, 1/2), but its reliability Q(1/4, 1/8, 1/2) ≈ 0.56 is lower than Q(0, 1/8, 1/2) ≈ 0.58. This
is because in the latter jury the second voter is more likely to copy the vote of the first voter,
with the consequence that the vote of the most able final voter might not count at all. Fixing
the abilities of the second and third voters at 1/8 and 1/2, the reliability of a jury with the first
voter having ability x is given by
Q
(
x,
1
8
,
1
2
)
= q
(
x,
1
8
,
1
2
)
=
9488− 2568x+ 3745x2 − 380x3 − 528x4 − 64x5
512 (32− x− 4x2) ,
which is plotted in Figure 1 as a function of x ∈ [0, 1].
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.70
Figure 1: Reliability of jury (x, 1/8, 1/2) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
However, the following monotonicity holds.
Theorem 3. The reliability Q(a, b, c) of the majority verdict for honest sequential voting in
ability sequence (a, b, c) is non-decreasing in both b, c ∈ [0, 1] and in a ∈ [c/2, 1].
Proof. We present a complete proof in Appendix A.5. However, for monotonicity in c, the
ability of the last juror, we would like to present an additional proof here for obtaining more
intuition, which is applicable for any sized jury. If the verdict has already been decided, or if
he herds and votes without looking at his signal, the reliability will not depend on his ability.
But with a positive probability, neither of these conditions applies. In this case he is essentially
a jury of one, for some a priori probability θ of state c.
When the third voter comes to vote (after first two have split), it is the same as if he is a
jury of one, for some a priori θ, which we may assume without loss of generality is at least 1/2.
In this case his honest threshold is given by (5):
τc(θ) =
1− 2θ
c
, where 2θ − 1 < c.
The last juror is correct if s ≥ τ and nature is A or s ≤ τ and nature is B. So the reliability
of the single juror (and hence of the verdict) is given by
θ(1− Fc(τc(θ))) + (1− θ)Gc(τc(θ)) = 1
4c
(c2 + 2c+ 4θ2 − 4θ + 1).
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To see that this expression is increasing in c, note that its derivative with respect to c is
c2 − 4θ2 + 4θ − 1
4c2
=
(c− 2θ + 1)(c+ 2θ − 1)
4c2
,
which is positive for c > 2θ − 1 (the case we are assuming, where he does not heard). 
We note that if the jury is in the optimal order established above in Theorem 2, then we
have a ≥ c and hence a ≥ c/2, so we have the following.
Corollary 1. Given any three-member jury, the reliability of honest majority verdict is non-
decreasing in the ability of each juror under optimal voting sequence given in Theorem 2.
We conclude by giving two more examples of abler juries with worse reliability. To show that
this can happen with b > c (closer to our optimal order), note that Q(0, 24/25, 15/16 ≈ 0.76791),
while Q(1/100, 24/25, 15/16) ≈ 0.76786. To show that the loss in reliability can be large, note
that Q(0, 1/20, 9/10) ≈ 0.62, while Q(1/10, 1/20, 9/10) = 0.53, approximately a 15% loss of
reliability. This is a more extreme version of our first example, where increasing the ability of
the first voter increases the chances that the able last voter will vote after the verdict has been
decided.
8 Seniority vs. anti-seniority voting orders
While little attention has been paid (until recently) on determining the optimal voting order,
there has been much discussion on the relative performance (reliability) of seniority order (SO),
in decreasing order of seniority or ability, with respect to anti-seniority order (AO), where voting
is in increasing order. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) give an extensive survey of the practice and
theory of SO vs. AO. They point out that the AO practiced in the ancient Sanhedrin and until
recently for voting in the United States Supreme Court. In tennis and badminton, the referee,
usually a more senior figure, votes after the lines-persons. It can be argued that Hawkeye, the
computer arbiter of close calls, who is the final arbiter, is the most able. Sometimes, both SO
and AO are used. Hall and Brace (1992) note that in courts where opinions are assigned at the
discretion of the Chief Justice, conference discussion is SO and voting is AO. Appellate decisions
in courts usually have more senior (equals more able?) judges in the higher courts, thus AO.
Qualitatively, it would seem that AO is less susceptible to herding. On the other hand, since
the most able jurors vote late, the majority decision may have already been confirmed before
they are reached. So while conventional opinion may be on the side of AO, we find (at least for
three-member juries) that it is dominated by SO.
To see this property of three-member juries, we look back at an earlier result. If the jury
consists of three jurors of abilities a1 < a2 < a3, then seniority order (a3, a2, a1) can be obtained
from anti-seniority order (a1, a2, a3) by simply transposing the first and last juror. We considered
the effect of such a transposition in Proposition 4, where we showed that Q(b, c, a) > Q(a, c, b)
for any c if a < b. By taking a3 = b, a1 = a and a2 = c, we obtain the following dominance of
seniority sequence over anti-seniority sequence.
Theorem 4. In honest sequential majority voting of three jurors of distinct abilities, the se-
niority sequence has a strictly higher reliability of the verdict than the anti-seniority sequence.
For larger juries of odd size n > 3, we ask the following question: When a random jury is
chosen, and assigned signals according to abilities, what is the probability that the seniority
order is correct when the two orders (SO and AO) give different verdicts? Our results are given
below.
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For each odd-size jury n = 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, we generate one million random juries with abilities
taken uniformly and independently from the interval [0, 1]. To each, we assign random signal
vectors, generated according to the abilities and assuming state of Nature A. We calculate the
majority verdicts X and Y by each, where X is based on AO and Y is based on SO. Thus
A is the correct verdict. We record in Table 1 the number of verdict pairs (X,Y ) (which we
denote by #(X,Y )), where neither ordering is correct (B,B), both are correct (A,A), only AO
is correct (A,B) and only SO is correct (B,A). The final column ρ gives the fraction of the
cases where SO is correct when exactly one of the two is correct:
R =
#(B,A)
#(B,A) + #(A,B)
.
Jury size n #(B,B) #(A,A) #(A,B) #(B,A) R (%)
5 118912 565227 133707 182154 58
7 92854 586934 131373 188839 59
9 75829 603487 128540 192144 60
11 64262 619118 124470 192150 61
Table 1: Relative performance of jury orderings: AO and SO
As we can see from Table 1, When the verdicts under the two orderings differ, SO is correct
about 58% of the time for juries of size 5, increasing to about 61% of the time for juries of size
11. This analysis refines earlier simulation work of Alpern and Chen (2017a).
9 Comparison with other voting schemes
Now let us consider some ideal situation for achieving maximum possible reliability, where the
jurors jointly choose thresholds to maximize verdict reliability. We say such voting is strategic.
Although strategic voting apparently cannot be realized easily in practice, we use the reliability
under strategic voting as a benchmark. Another well-known voting scheme is simultaneous
voting (or secret ballot), in which all voters vote independently.
9.1 Strategic voting
Given a priori probability θ of A, under sequential majority voting, let the thresholds of the
three voters of abilities a, b, c in their voting order be respectively x, {y1, y2} and {z1, z2}, where
y1 and y2 are the thresholds of the second voter after vote of A and B, respectively, by the first
voter; z1 and z2 are the thresholds of the third voter after vote of AB and BA, respectively, by
the first two voters. Note that we do not need to consider prior votes of AA and BB. Then the
reliability Qstr(θ, a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2) of the jury majority verdict under strategic voting is:
Qstr(θ, a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2) = θ((1− F (a, x))F (b, y1)(1− F (c, z1))
+ F (a, x)(1− F (b, y2))(1− F (c, z2)) + (1− F (a, x))(1− F (b, y1)))
+ (1− θ)((1−G(a, x))G(b, y1)G(c, z1)
+G(a, x)(1−G(b, y2))G(c, z2) +G(a, x)G(b, y2)).
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With strategic voting, the three voters jointly choose x, y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ [−1,+1] to maximize
Qstr(θ, a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2). Direct calculation for θ = 1/2 gives
Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2) =
1
64(a(x
2 − 1)(bc(y21(z21 − 1) + y22(z22 − 1) (20)
− z21 − z22 + 2) + 4(y1(z1 + 1) + y2(z2 − 1) + z1 − z2 − 2))
+ 4(b((x− 1)y21(z1 + 1) + (x+ 1)y22(z2 − 1)− xz1 − xz2 + z1 − z2 + 2)
+ c((x− 1)y1(z21 − 1) + (x+ 1)y2(z22 − 1) + xz21 − xz22 − z21 − z22 + 2) + 8)).
It is straightforward to check that
Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2) = Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c,−x,−y2,−y1,−z2,−z1).
This indicates that, as a quadratic function of x, the following
max
{
Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c, x, y1, y2, z1, z2) : −1 ≤ y1, y2, z1, z1 ≤ 1
}
is symmetric with respect to the axis x = 0. Therefore, we conclude from the continuity of
function Qstr and compactness of its variable domain that reliability of strategic sequential
voting
Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c) = max−1≤y1,y2,z1,z2≤1
Qstr(
1
2 , a, b, c, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2). (21)
In fact, the above mathematics can be easily explained as follows: given two equally likely states
of Nature, A and B, due to symmetry between A and B, optimal strategic threshold profiles of
a three-member jury are symmetric in the sense that if a profile τ = (x, y1, y2, z1, z2) is optimal
for deciding (A,B), then τ˜ = (−x,−y2,−y1,−z2,−z1) is optimal for deciding (B,A). We also
note that strategic voting is a Nash equilibrium of the sequential voting game where the utility
of each juror is 1 if the majority verdict is correct, 0 otherwise.
9.2 Simultaneous voting
When voting is simultaneous, each voter has a unique threshold since his vote is not dependent
on any prior voting. Given a priori probability θ of A and a three-member jury of abilities
{a, b, c} with respective thresholds {x, y, z}, the reliability Qsim(θ, a, b, c, x, y, z) of simultaneous
voting is given as follows:
Qsim(θ, a, b, c, x, y, z) = θ((1− Fa(x))(1− Fb(y)) + (1− Fa(x))Fb(y)(1− Fc(z))
+ Fa(x)(1− Fb(y))(1− Fc(z))) + (1− θ)(Ga(x)Gb(y)
+Ga(x)(1−Gb(y))Gc(z) + (1−Ga(x))Gb(y)Gc(z)).
Hence the reliability of simultaneous honest voting is achieved by setting the thresholds at
{τa(θ), τb(θ), τc(θ)}:
Qsim(θ, a, b, c) = Qsim(θ, a, b, c, τa(θ), τb(θ), τc(θ)).
9.3 Homogeneity and heterogeneity
Let us start with a definition concerning homogeneity and heterogeneity of the abilities of the
jurors.
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Definition 1. Given any ability set {a, b, c} with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1, let
λ(a, b, c) = min {{a/b : if b > 0}, {b/c : if c > 0}} ;
µ(a, b, c) = min {{b/a : if a > 0}, {c/b : if b > 0}} .
Specifically, we define λ(0, 0, 0) = µ(0, 0, 0) = 1 and µ(0, 0, c) = +∞ if c > 0. We say that ability
set {a, b, c} with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1 has a homogeneity index λ(a, b, c) and a heterogeneity index
µ(a, b, c).
Note that we always have 0 ≤ λ(a, b, c) ≤ 1 ≤ µ(a, b, c). Apparently, the higher its ho-
mogeneity index, the more homogeneous the ability set is, with perfect homogeneity achieved
when the index is 1 (i.e., a = b = c). Similarly, the higher its heterogeneity index, the more
heterogeneous the ability set is.
9.4 Sequential voting vs. simultaneous voting
As opposed to the simultaneous voting scheme analyzed by Condorcet, sequential voting has
advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that later voters have more information. One
disadvantage is the possibility of herding, where the information of later voters is not used.
Theorem 5. For any three-member jury on two equally likely states of Nature, if its ability set
has a homogeneity index at least 6/7, then simultaneous honest voting has a higher reliability
than sequential honest voting. On the other hand, if its ability set has a heterogeneity index at
least 4/3, then sequential voting in the optimal order has a higher reliability than simultaneous
voting.
Proof. See Appendix A.6. 
The results in Theorem 5 can be illustrated in Figure 2, in which we set the middle ability
b = 1/2 and consider the square (a, c) ∈ [0, 1/2] × [1/2, 1]. The curved line divides this square
into two regions, where sequential (top-left) and simultaneous (bottom-right) voting are optimal.
Within these two regions are the respective rectangles where Theorem 5 guarantees simultaneous
voting is better (λ ≥ 6/7) and where sequential voting is better (µ ≥ 4/3). Note that when
b = 1/2, the condition λ ≥ 6/7 corresponds to rectangle {(a, c) : a ≥ 3/7, c ≤ 7/12}, while
condition µ ≥ 4/3 corresponds to rectangle {(a, c) : a ≤ 3/8, c ≥ 2/3}.
Remark 4. Theorem 5 shows that, when a jury is highly homogeneous, simultaneous voting helps
diversify the homogeneity. On the other hand, when a jury is highly heterogeneous, sequential
voting helps unify the heterogeneity. Interestingly, our above theorem seems consistent with
the result for simultaneous voting obtained by Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2017) in that high
reliability of simultaneous voting needs homogeneity, while diversity calls for sequential voting.
Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2017) show that when adding voters to a jury to increase its reliability,
homogeneity is useful.
9.5 Diversity for reliability
We can now answer the question of whether homogeneous or heterogenous juries have higher
reliability under sequential honest majority voting.
Theorem 6. Under honest majority voting on two equally likely states of Nature, fixing the
average ability of any three-member jury, reliability is a strictly increasing function of the het-
erogeneity index. In other words, heterogeneity of jurors abilities helps increase reliability.
Proof. See Appendix A.7. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of majority voting scheme: Simultaneous vs. sequential
9.6 Optimality of honest voting
According to Theorem 5, simultaneous voting can have higher reliability than sequential under
honest voting. This cannot occur under strategic voting, since the jurors could ignore prior
voting and thus achieve the reliability of simultaneous voting. The next theorem provides a
sufficient condition for achieving strategic optimality (see Section 9.1).
Theorem 7. Given equally likely states of Nature, sequential honest voting (in optimal or-
der) achieves strategic optimality if heterogeneity of the jurors’ abilities is at least 7/4, while
simultaneous honest voting achieves strategic optimality if the jurors all have the same ability.
Proof. See Appendix A.8. 
10 Larger juries
Up to now we have considered the optimal voting order problem only for juries of size three,
where we have the definitive result Theorem 2. For larger juries we only know the optimal
ordering for the last two jurors (decreasing ability, see Theorem 1) and we have some numerical
results comparing the seniority order (SO) with the anti-seniority order (AO) in Section 8,
namely, the former is more likely to be correct when the verdicts differ. For larger juries the
“curse of dimensionality” prevents us from using the earlier technique of deriving a formula for
the reliability of a jury with a given order of abilities because the number of thresholds increases
exponentially in the jury size. So in this section we will use simulation to estimate this reliability,
by generating many random signal vectors for a given ability order jury, assuming one of the
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alternatives (say A) holds. For each, we compute the verdict. Finally, we estimate reliability as
the fraction of verdicts which are correct (in this case, A).
In general, we cannot consider all possible orderings (permutations) of a set of abilities. In
addition to SO and AO, we propose a new ordering which we call the Ascending-Descending
Order (ADO). For a jury of odd size n = 2m+ 1, this ordering begins with the most able m+ 1
jurors voting in increasing (anti-seniority) order and then has the m least able jurors voting
in descending (seniority) order. In particular, the median ability juror votes first, the highest
ability juror votes in the median position and the least able juror votes last.
Definition 2. Given a set of n = 2m+ 1 distinct abilities indexed in increasing order 0 ≤ a1 <
a2 < · · · < an ≤ 1, the Ascending-Descending Order (ADO) is given by
(am+1, am+2, . . . , an, am, am−1, . . . , a2, a1) .
Note that for n = 3 our main result, Theorem 2, says that the ADO is the unique optimal
ordering. Furthermore, ADO has its last two jurors voting in decreasing order, which is a
requirement of any optimal ordering according to Theorem 1. Our simulation, admittedly
limited in number, have not yet produced any counter-examples to the following.
Conjecture 1. For any fixed set of an odd number of distinct abilities for a jury, the ordering
that produces the highest reliability is the ADO.
Of course we have already proved the conjecture for juries of size three in Theorem 2. Even
if the ADO turns out to not always be optimal, our simulation results seem to show that it a
good heuristic, producing high reliabilities.
Our first simulation is concerned with a jury of size five, which we take as the ability set
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, which is in some sense uniformly distributed. For simplicity, we denote
them by {1, 3, 5, 7, 9} for the rest of this section. If two abilities are very close, then transposing
the voting order of the two corresponding jurors would not greatly affect the reliability, and the
difference might be less than the error in the simulation. There are 5! = 120 orderings of such a
jury, but only 60 for which the last two abilities are in decreasing order. We calculated 100,000
random signal vectors (generated from alternative A) for each such ordering and counted the
number of (correct) verdicts for A, this number divided by 100,000 is an estimate of reliability.
Of these 60, exactly 9 had an estimated reliability ρˆ above 76%. We then calculated 1,000,000
trials for these, listing the results in Table 2 below. The estimates have error less than 0.1%
with a confidence of 90%. Note that ADO has the highest estimated reliability, at 77%.
Voting Order No. of A Verdicts Est. Reliability ρˆ
(5, 7, 9, 3, 1) 770, 199 77.0%
(7, 5, 9, 3, 1) 766, 450 76.6%
(1, 7, 9, 5, 3) 762, 953 76.3%
(7, 3, 9, 5, 1) 762, 488 76.2%
(7, 9, 1, 5, 3) 762, 437 76.2%
(5, 9, 7, 3, 1) 762, 326 76.2%
(7, 9, 5, 3, 1) 762, 186 76.2%
(7, 9, 3, 5, 1) 761, 472 76.1%
(7, 1, 9, 5, 3) 761, 321 76.1%
Table 2: Estimated reliability of five-member juries
22
The increasing order (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) (AO) had ρˆ = 71.5%; the decreasing order (9, 7, 5, 3, 1)
(SO) had ρˆ = 75.5%; the ordering with the lowest estimated reliability was (5, 3, 1, 9, 7) with
ρˆ = 64.2%. It is worth noting that there is more than a 10% difference in reliability between
ADO and the worst ordering.
To look at seven-member juries, it is no longer feasible to check the reliability of all 7!/2 =
2520 orderings even of a particular set of abilities. Instead, we generated 500 random juries ~a
(independently picking each juror with an ability uniformly in [0, 1]). For each, we calculated
the estimated reliability ρˆ(~a) and ρˆ∗(~a∗), where ~a∗ is the reordering of ~a to ADO. For example,
if ~a = (0.3, 0.6, 0.4, 0.1, 0.8, 0.5, 0.7) then ~a∗ = (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1). We used 10,000
trials for each randomly generated jury ~a, and calculated the difference ∆ˆ(~a) = ρˆ∗(~a) − ρˆ(~a)
between reliability in ADO order and in the originally generated order. The mean value of
∆ˆ was 0.036969 (roughly a 4% improvement in the reliability of the verdict), the maximum
was 0.1609 (a 16% improvement in reliability) and the minimum was −0.0064. The frequency
distribution is given in Table 3 (no data at boundary points).
Range (−.02, 0) (0, .02) (.02, .04) (.04, .06) (.06, .08)
Frequency 10 139 171 94 45
Range (.08, .10) (.10, .12) (.12, .14) (.14, .16) (.16, .18)
Frequency 20 14 6 0 1
Table 3: Frequency distribution of ∆ˆ
So from the heuristic point of view, it certainly seems a good idea to rearrange a jury (of
size 7), which arrives in random order, into one in ADO order, if this is allowed. It nearly
always gives an improvement in reliability. From the theoretical point of view, it at first may
appear that we have found ten counter-examples to our Conjecture 1 regarding the optimality
of ADO, in that the original order of the jurors that produced a negative ∆ˆ is more reliable
than ADO. However, the negative values were very close to zero. There were 11 juries ~a where
∆ˆ(~a) < 0.001 and we recalculated ∆ˆ for all of them with one million trials. All came out with a
positive value of ∆ˆ. There was one additional jury ~a for which ∆ˆ(~a) was not negative but was
less than 0.001. We also recalculated this for one million trials and checked that it still came
out positive.
Another way of evaluating the ADO is to compare it to SO (Seniority, or Descending Order),
in the same way we compared SO to AO in Section 8. For odd values of n = 5, 7, 9, 11 , we
generate one million random juries with associated random signals generated, assuming Nature
is A. We record in Table 4 (with the same notation as in Table 1) the number of verdict pairs
for ADO and SO, respectively, and determine the probability that ADO is the correct verdict
(that is, A) when the two verdicts differ.
Jury size n #(B,B) #(A,A) #(A,B) #(B,A) R (%)
5 150631 656425 101988 90956 53
7 117189 682142 107038 93631 53
9 94630 702166 109739 93465 54
11 78453 719629 110279 91639 55
Table 4: Relative performance of jury orderings: ADO and SO
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From Table 4, we see that when ADO and SO give different verdicts, ADO is the correct
one about 53% of the time for juries of size five, rising to about 55% of the time for juries of
size 11.
11 Concluding remarks
When jurors of differing abilities vote sequentially, the reliability of the majority verdict depends
on the voting order. We have shown that, regardless of the set of abilities on a three-member
jury, if the two states are equally likely, then the optimal voting order is always median ability
first, then highest ability, then lowest ability. The optimality of the ordering is robust for the a
priori probability θ around 1/2.
Our earlier paper, Alpern and Chen (2017a) showed that this was true for many ability sets,
but this is the first paper to establish this result rigorously for all ability sets. Analogous results
for larger juries appear to be beyond current methods, but presumably special cases could be
studied, for example, when only one juror has a different ability than the others.
Since the optimal ordering is established, we can fix this ordering and then make various
reliability comparisons. To do this, we have defined indices that measure homogeneity and
heterogeneity of the set of jurors. We find that for sufficiently homogeneous juries, simultaneous
voting is more reliable than sequential voting. On the other hand, when juries are sufficiently
heterogeneous, sequential voting is more reliable. In a similar vein, we find that the reliability
of a jury of fixed average ability is increasing in its heterogeneity. For sufficiently heterogeneous
juries, the thresholds given by honest voting are in fact the optimal joint thresholds, so that
honest voting optimizes the reliability of the majority verdict. That is, honest voting is also
strategic.
For larger juries, we have introduced the Ascending-Descending Order of voting and shown
that it is at least an excellent heuristic for obtaining high reliability, if not actually optimal.
Further work in this direction for large juries would be useful, including asymptotic results
analogous to those of Condorcet.
An area of future research is the analysis of sequential voting under rules other than majority.
References
Ali, S., Goeree, J., Kartik, N. and Palfrey, T.R. (2008). Information amalgamation by voting.
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 98(2), 181–186.
Alpern, S. and Baston, V. (2016). The secretary problem with a selection committee: Do
conformist committees hire better secretaries? Management Science 63(4), 1184–1197.
Alpern, S. and Chen, B. (2017a). The importance of voting order for jury decisions made by
sequential majority votes. European Journal of Operational Research 258(3), 1072–1081.
Alpern, S. and Chen, B. (2017b). Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting
to amalgamate information. Theory and Decision 83(2), 259–282.
Alpern, S., Gal, S. and Solan, E. (2010). A sequential selection game with vetoes. Games and
Economic Behavior 68(1), 1–14.
Baharad, E., Goldberger, J., Koppel, M. and Nitzan, S. (2012). Beyond Condorcet: optimal
aggregation rules using voting records. Theory and Decision 72(1), 113–130.
24
Ben-Yashar, R. and Danziger, L. (2016). The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric com-
mittees. Journal of Mathematical Economics 64, 107–112,
Ben-Yashar, R. and Nitzan, S. (2017). Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision
makers? Theory and Decision 82, 395–402.
Besbes, O. and Scarsini, M. (2016). On information distortions in online ratings. Forthcoming
in: Operations Research.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I.(1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and
cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 992–1026.
Celis, L.E., Krafft, P.M. and Kobe, N. (2016). Sequential voting promotes collective discovery
in social recommendation systems. In: ICWSM, 42–51.
Condorcet, M.J.A.N.C. (1785). Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a` la Prababilite´ des Deci-
sions Rendues a` la Pluralite´ des Voix (Impr. Royale, Paris); reprinted (1972) (Chelsea, New
York).
Dekel, E. and Piccione, M. (2000). Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections.
Journal of Political Economy 108(1), 34–55.
Feddersen, T.J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1998). Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unan-
imous jury verdicts under strategic voting. American Political Science Review 92 (1), 23–35.
Hall, M.G. and Brace, P. (1992). Toward an integrated model of judicial voting behavior. Amer-
ican Politics Quarterly 20, 147–168.
Ottaviani, M. and Sørensen, P. (2001). Information aggregation in debate: who should speak
first? Journal of Public Economics 81(3), 393–421.
Romme, A.G.L. (2004). Unanimity rule and organizational decision making: A simulation
model. Organization Science 15, 704–718.
Wolfram Research, Inc. (2017). FullSimplify[expr,assum]; FindInstance[expr,vars]. Mathematica
11.1.
25
Appendix
A.1 Explicit reliability function in Section 5.5.1
Explicit expression of the reliability function in (16) is as follows:
Q¯
(
1
2
; b, c
)
=

c+4
8 , if b = 0;
b+2
4 , if (b, c) ∈ H2;
(b+2c)2+16c
32c , otherwise.
For all 0 < b, c < 1 and 1/2 < θ < 1:
Q¯ (θ; b, c) =

θ, if b+ 1 < 2θ;
b(b+2)+(1−2θ)2
4b , if b+ 1 ≤ 2θ or 2c θ(b+ 2θ − 2) > (b+ 1)(c− 1) + 2θ;
h(θ; b, c), otherwise;
where
h(θ; b, c) =
1
16bc(b(2θ − 1) + 4(θ − 1)θ − 1)
(−4θ2 ((b+ 1)((b− 4)b− 2)c2 + 2b(5− 3b)c+ 3b− 8c+ 3)
+ 2(b+ 1)θ
(
(b+ 1)(2b− 3)c2 + 2(b− 3)bc+ 3b+ 3)
+ 16c θ4((b− 5)c+ 2)− 8θ3(c(b((b+ 4)c− 6)− 6c+ 8)− 1)
− (b+ 1)3(c+ 1)2 + 32c2θ5).
For all 0 < b, c < 1 and 0 < θ < 1/2:
Q¯ (θ; b, c) =

1− θ, if b+ 2θ < 1 and c+ 2θ < 1;
b(b+2)+(1−2θ)2
4b , if b+ 2θ ≥ 1 and 2c θ(b+ 2θ − 2) > (b+ 1)(c− 1) + 2θ;
c(c+2)+(1−2θ)2
4c , if b+ 2θ < 1 and c+ 2θ ≥ 1;
h(θ; b, c), otherwise.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Using the last equation in (16) with the explicit expression in Appendix A.1 above, we compute
Q¯(θ; b, c) for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and any b, c ∈ [0, 1]. We then prove that Q¯(θ; c, b) − Q¯(θ; b, c) ≥ 0
when c ≥ b. To this end, we use Wolfram Mathematica, a mathematical symbolic computa-
tion program, with its command FullSimplify[expr,assum], where expr is replaced by expres-
sion Q¯(θ; c, b) − Q¯(θ; b, c) ≥ 0 and assum is replaced by constraints c > b and θ, b, c ∈ [0, 1].
The command outputs True in a couple of seconds. Alternatively, we also use command
FindInstance[expr,vars], where expr is replaced by the system of inequalities Q¯(θ; c, b) −
Q¯(θ; b, c) < 0, c > b and θ, b, c ∈ [0, 1], while vars is replaced by the specification of vari-
ables {θ, b, c}. The command outputs the empty set ∅ (i.e., there is no solution to the system)
in a couple of seconds. In the remainder of the Appendix, wherever we can prove, in the
aforementioned ways, an inequality subject to some (inequality) constraints, we will simply use
citation of Wolfram Research (2017) with a specification of the inequality and the constraints.
A.3 Remaining proof of Proposition 3
Part 1
As explained in Appendix A.2 above, we cite Wolfram Research (2017) with target inequality
of f1(a, b, c) > 0 and constraints a, b, c ∈ [0, 1], ρ(b, a) < c ≤ ρ(a, b) and b/2 < a < b.
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Part 2
Now consider c > ρ(a, b). If (b, a) ∈ H2, then
∆1(a, b, c) = q(a, b, c)− b+ 2
4
=
f2(a, b, c)
128bc(8− a2 − 2ab) ,
where
f2(a, b, c) =− 4(a− 2b)3 + 4(8− a2 − 2ab)(a2 + 4ab− 4b2)c
+ (2b− a)(8− a2 − 2ab)2c2.
As a convex quadratic function of c, f1(a, b, c) is minimized at
c1 =
2(4b2 − a2 − 4ab)
(2b− a)(8− a2 − 2ab)
to
f2(a, b, c1) =
64a2b(b− a)
2b− a > 0.
If (b, a) 6∈ H2, then it is easy to check that ρ(a, b) > ρ(b, a) and hence c > ρ(a, b) > ρ(b, a).
We obtain
∆1(a, b, c) = q(a, b, c)− q(b, a, c) = (b− a)f3(a, b, c)
128abc(8− a2 − 2ab)(8− 2ab− b2) ,
where
f3(a, b, c) = c
2(a+ b)(8− a2 − 2ab)(8− a2 − b2)(8− 2ab− b2)
− 4c(8− a2 − 2ab)(a2 + ab+ b2)(8− 2ab− b2)
− 4(a+ b)(10a3b− 7a2b2 − 8a2 + 10ab3 − 16ab− 8b2),
which is positive under constraints c > ρ(a, b) and b/2 < a < b with a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] (Wolfram
Research, 2017).
A.4 Remaining proof of Proposition 4
According to (19), if c ≤ a/2, then c < b/2, we have ∆2(a, b, c) ≡ Q(b, c, a) − Q(a, c, b) =
(b− a)/4 > 0. If a/2 < c ≤ b/2, then according to (13), b > ρ(a, c), which leads to
∆2(a, b, c) =
2 + b
4
− q(a, c, b),
which is positive under constraints a/2 < c ≤ b/2 and a, b ∈ [0, 1] (Wolfram Research, 2017).
Therefore, we only need to consider c > b/2. If a ≤ ρ(b, c) and b ≤ ρ(a, c), then
∆2(a, b, c) = q0(b, c)− q0(a, c) = b
2 − a2
16c
> 0.
If a ≤ ρ(b, c) and b > ρ(a, c), then
∆2(a, b, c) = q0(b, c)− q(a, c, b) = f4(a, b, c)
128bc(8− a2 − 2ac) ,
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where
f4(a, b, c) = a
5b2 + 2a4b2c+ 4a4b− 4a3b2c2 − 16a3b2 + 24a3bc+ 4a3 − 8a2b3
− 8a2b2c3 + 16a2bc2 − 32a2b− 24a2c− 16ab3c+ 64ab2c2 + 64ab2
− 32abc3 − 128abc+ 48ac2 + 64b3 − 128b2c+ 128bc2 − 32c3,
which is positive when a ≤ ρ(b, c), b > ρ(a, c) and b/2 < c ≤ 1 with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 (Wolfram
Research, 2017).
If a > ρ(b, c), then b > a and c > b/2 imply that b > ρ(a, c). Therefore, we have
∆2(a, b, c) = q(b, c, a)− q(a, c, b)) = (b− a)f5(a, b, c)
128abc(8− a2 − 2ac)(8− b2 − 2bc) ,
where
f5(a, b, c) = a
5b4 + 2a5b3c− 8a5b2 + a4b5 + 4a4b4c+ 4a4b3c2 − 4a4b3 − 8a4b2c
− 32a4b+ 2a3b5c+ 4a3b4c2 − 4a3b4 − 16a3b3c+ 16a3b2c2 + 36a3b2
− 56a3bc− 32a3 − 8a2b5 − 8a2b4c+ 16a2b3c2 + 36a2b3 − 144a2b2c
− 48a2bc2 + 224a2b+ 192a2c− 32ab4 − 56ab3c− 48ab2c2 + 224ab2
+ 128abc3 + 192abc− 384ac2 − 32b3 + 192b2c− 384bc2 + 256c3,
which is proved when a > ρ(b, c), b > ρ(a, c) and b/2 < c ≤ 1 with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 (Wolfram
Research, 2017).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove the stated monotonicity of Q(a, b, c) in a, b, c respectively, we only need to do so for each
of the three pieces of Q(a, b, c) in (19) thanks to the continuity of Q(a, b, c) over a, b, c ∈ [0, 1].
The stated monotonicity of Q(a, b, c) ≡ (2 + a)/4 is evident over domain H2. We show that
q0(a, b) and q(b, c, a) have the stated monotonicity over H3 and S, respectively. We accomplish
this by verifying (Wolfram Research, 2017) that each of the following two partial derivatives
∂q0(a, b)
∂a
,
∂q0(a, b)
∂b
is positive over H3; and each of the following three partial derivatives
∂q(a, b, c)
∂a
,
∂q(a, b, c)
∂b
,
∂q(a, b, c)
∂c
is positive over S together with constraint a ≥ c/2, S and S, respectively.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Let (a, b, c) ∈ Ho(6/7). Then with formulae derived in the previous sections, we have
Qsim
(
1
2 , a, b, c
)−Q(b, c, a) = h1(a, b, c)
128ac (8− 2bc− b2) ,
where
h1(a, b, c) = a
2b
(
8− b2) (8− 2bc− b2)− 4ab2 (8− 2bc− b2)− 4(2c− b)3,
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which is positive when (a, b, c) ∈ Ho(67) (Wolfram Research, 2017). On the other hand, if
(a, b, c) ∈ He(43), then we have
Q(b, c, a)−Qsim
(
1
2 , a, b, c
)
=

h2(a, b, c)
32c
, if a
(
b2 + 2bc− 8)+ 4c ≥ 2b;
−h1(a, b, c)
128ac (8− 2bc− b2) , otherwise;
where
h2(a, b, c) = bc(ac− 4) + 4c(c− a) + 2b2.
In both cases, h2(a, b, c) and −h1(a, b, c) are positive when (a, b, c) ∈ He(4/3) (Wolfram Re-
search, 2017).
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Let the average ability of the jury be m. Then the three abilities can be expressed as functions
of m and the heterogeneity index µ as follows:
a¯(m,µ) =
3m
µ2 + µ+ 1
, b¯(m,µ) =
3mµ
µ2 + µ+ 1
, c¯(m,µ) =
3mµ2
µ2 + µ+ 1
.
Then the following function Q¯(m,µ)(m,µ) (0 ≤ m ≤ 1 and µ ≥ 1) is the reliability of honest
majority voting by the jury with optimal voting sequence:
Q¯(m,µ) = Q
(
b¯(m,µ), c¯(m,µ), a¯(m,µ)
)
.
An explicit expression of the function Q¯(m,µ) is as follows:
Q¯(m,µ) =

Q¯1(m,µ) ≡
3
(
4µ2 + 1
)
m
16 (µ2 + µ+ 1)
+
1
2
, w(m,µ) ≥ 0;
Q¯2(m,µ) ≡ u(m,µ)
v(m,µ)
, otherwise;
where
w(m,µ) = 2
(
µ2 + µ+ 1
)2 (
2µ2 − µ− 4)+ 9(2µ+ 1)µ2m2,
u(m,µ) = 512µ
(
µ2 + µ+ 1
)5
+ 243µ4(2µ− 1)(2µ+ 1)2m5
−108µ2 (µ2 + µ+ 1)2 (2µ+ 1) (4µ3 + 4µ2 + 9µ− 4)m3
−576µ3(2µ+ 1) (µ2 + µ+ 1)3m2
+12
(
µ2 + µ+ 1
)4 (
8µ5 − 12µ4 + 38µ3 + 31µ2 + 40µ− 16)m,
v(m,µ) = 1024µ
(
µ2 + µ+ 1
)5 − 1152µ3(2µ+ 1) (µ2 + µ+ 1)3m2.
For any fixed m ∈ (0, 1), function w(m,µ) in domain {µ : w(m,µ) ≥ 0} and functions Q¯1(m,µ)
and Q¯2(m,µ) in domain {µ : µ ≥ 1} are all strictly increasing, which can be shown by verifying
that the relevant partial derivatives are positive under corresponding constraints (Wolfram
Research, 2017). Similarly, we can shown that, if 1 ≤ µ1 < µ2 and w(m,µ1) < 0 ≤ w(m,µ2),
then
Q¯(m,µ2) = Q¯1(m,µ2) > Q¯2(m,µ1) = Q¯(m,µ1).
Combination of these facts implies that Q(m,µ) is strictly increasing in µ ≥ 1 for any fixed
m ∈ (0, 1).
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A.8 Proof of Theorem 7
Let (a, b, c) ∈ He(74). Then reliability of sequential honest voting is Q(b, c, a) = q0(b, c) according
to (19), while Qstr is clearly non-decreasing in a. Therefore, with a ≤ 47b, the difference of the
two reliabilities is at least
q0(b, c)−Qstr(12 , b, c, 47b, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2) = 1112c Ω(b, c, c, y1, y2, z1, z2),
where
Ω(b, c, d, y1, y2, z1, z2) = 7c
2(y21(1 + z1) + y
2
2(1− z2) + 2− z1 + z2)
+ b c(y1(4z
2
1 + 7z1 + 3) + y2(−4z22 + 7z2 − 3) + 4z21 + 7z1 + 4z22 − 7z2 − 22)
+ b2(7 + d2((1− y21)(1− z21) + (1− y22)(1− z22)).
We show that Ω is non-negative when d = c, from which and (21) the first part of the theorem
follows. Note that the coefficient of d2 in the Ω function is non-negative. Therefore, Ω is lower
bounded by its value at d = 0:
Ω(b, c, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2) = b
2 Ω(1, µ, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2),
where µ ≡ c/b ≥ 7/4. We can show that Ω(b, c, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2) ≥ 0 subject to µ ≥ 7/4 and
y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ [−1, 1] (Wolfram Research, 2017).
The second part of the theorem follows from (21) and the fact that (Wolfram Research,
2017):
Qsim(
1
2 , a, a, a) ≥ Qstr(12 , a, a, a, 0, y1, y2, z1, z2)
for any a ∈ [0, 1] and y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ [−1, 1].
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